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Foreword

ACCESS TO JUSTICE AS A
FOCUS OF RESEARCH
Mauro Cappelletti*
Bryant Garth**

We are very pleased to contribute to the first issue of the
Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice. The Yearbook has a
unique potential, especially given that one problem with the
study of access to justice is our limited access to information
directly relevant to the topic. The study of access to justice
necessitates the cooperation of a number of intellectual
disciplines, but each discipline tends to write in its own
specialized language, for its own narrow audience, and for
journals of very limited circulation. Some interchange among
disciplines takes place in the footnotes, but an outsider may be
unable even to locate research, much less understand its
implications. The Windsor Yearbook has the opportunity to
reach out and bring together various disciplines in a way that
can promote constructive dialogue and deepen our
understanding of access to justice as a focus for research. In
addition, the Windsor Yearbook can help overcome the
problem of access to information about developments that are
not widely reported or are simply unknown outside of one or
two provinces, states, or countries. Comparative study
provides an essential means for separating what may be
unimportant, ephemeral national trends from more profound,
lasting social phenomena shared by a number of similar
societies. Thus, while we recognize the difficulties in starting a
new publication and making it truly interdisciplinary and
comparative, we applaud this effort and believe there is a
strong demand for such a publication on access to justice.
This foreword will provide a brief, comparative perspective
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on what we have called the "access-to-justice movement,"'
highlight some of the issues that contributors to the Yearbook
might consider, and examine access to justice both as a means
to realize substantive political ends and as a means to what may
be seen as primarily legal and procedural goals. One of our
themes will be the inevitable tension between the procedural
right of access to justice and the substantive goals of many
access-oriented reformers. Another will be the importance of
detailed research, such as may be included in this Yearbook.
Such research is essential to understand the direction of the
movement and how it responds and can respond to some of the
underlying policy dilemmas.
I. Access to Justice as a Movement
We have characterized the access-to-justice movement as
involving "waves" of reform aimed at the challenging problem
of making rights effective.2 Legal sociologists have taught us
that the most difficult rights to enforce are those which purport
to benefit relatively isolated and poor individuals against
powerful organizations and bureaucracies. 3 The welfare state,
especially as it emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, has been
characterized by a proliferation of rights fitting precisely that
pattern. Welfare, consumer, environmental, and a number of
employee rights have been created, but they have been
underenforced or even unenforced. As Bellow and Kettleson
recently remarked about the United States, the situation is
"what many observers . . . now recognize as an enforcement
crisis." 4
A first response of reformers - "the first wave" - was to
define the problem in terms of a relatively traditional view of
law and the legal system: unenforced rights represent "unmet
Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant Garth, "Access to Justice: The Worldwide
Movement to Make Rights Effective", in Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant
Garth, eds., Access to Justice: A World Survey (Alphen aan den
Rijn/Milan: Sijthoff & Noordhof/Giuffr , 1978, v.1 of the Florence
Access-to-Justice Project), [hereinafter cited as World Survey], 3 This
general report was published in somewhat different form in (1978), 27
Buffalo L. Rev. 181.
2d.

See, e.g., Marc Galanter, "Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead:
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change" (1974), 9 Law and Society
Rev. 95; Joel F. Handler, Social Reform Movements and the Legal System
(N.Y.: Academic Press, 1978)
4 Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, "From Ethics to Politics: Confronting
Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice" (1978), 58 Boston U.L.
Rev. 337.
See generally, Mauro Cappelletti, J. Gordley & E. Johnson Jr., Toward
Equal Justice: A Comparative Study of Legal Aid in Modern Societies
(Milan/Dobbs Ferry: Giuffr&/Oceana, 1975), [hereinafter cited as Equal
Justice].
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legal needs" that can be met if lawyers are made more
accessible. The focus here is on the procedural availability of
lawyers to the poor, rather than specifically on the substantive
goal of enforcing rights affirmatively. Major reforms toward
judicare legal aid systems in Western Europe, Australia, and
parts of Canada, thus sought to make lawyers available to
those who could not afford them.'
In the United States the response was somewhat different,
although still concerned primarily with the needs of the poor
for legal services. Primarily because of historical reasons 6 and
its connection with the War on Poverty, legal aid reform took
place through the proliferation of staff attorneys paid directly
by the Federal Government and located in deprived urban and
rural areas. 7 The connection with the War on Poverty fostered
a more substantive concern than was evident in judicare
programs. Neighbourhood law firms were to reach out to
clients, attract them to local offices, and facilitate the
vindication of the new rights; and they were to take action that
would expand and enforce on a large scale the rights of the
poor. While judicare connoted a right of equal access to
lawyers, the staff program in the United States implicated
lawyers more in the substantive goals of the War on Poverty.
The drama of activist neighbourhood law firms attracted
considerable attention, helping to stimulate innovation outside
the United States. Other countries were attracted to this
reform, partly because they were fighting their own wars or
battles against poverty; and it also became clear that the
American staff lawyers, more so than lawyers under judicare,
were handling the kinds of issues characteristic of the welfare
state and the "unmet legal need." 8 Lawyers and other
reformers, especially in England, Canada, and Australia, thus
called for a staff component to be added to their existing
judicare systems. Combined models of legal aid began to
emerge. 9
At the same time, although to a lesser extent, a movement
toward combined models of legal aid developed in the United
6 See generally, Joel F. Handler, Ellen Jane Hollingsworth, and Howard S.

Erlanger, Lawyers and the Pursuitof Rights (New York: Academic Press,
1978). One reason was that there already existed a network of legal aid
societies financed by charitable contributions. Another reason suggested by
these authors was that American "individualism" had led to an explicit
rejection in the early 1950s of the "socialistic" English judicare model.
See generally, Earl Johnson, Jr., Justice and Reform: The Formative Years
of the American Legal Services Program (New Brunswick: Transaction
Books, 1978); Harry P. Stumpf, Community Politics and Legal Services
(Beverly Hills: Sage, 1975).
8 See Bryant Garth, Neighborhood Law Firmsfor the Poor: A Comparative
Study of Recent Developments in Legal Aid and in the Legal Profession
(Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980), 145-170.

9 See Mauro Cappelletti et. al., Equal Justice, supra note 5, 525-628.
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States. There is now a growing acceptance in legal services
circles of the virtues of a legal aid system combining judicare
and staff components. This acceptance reflects partly the
continuing belief, even in the United States, that there should
be a basic legal right to a lawyer for those who cannot afford
one, 10 and partly it reflects a recognition that a combined
system better serves the more substantive goals of legal aid."
Legal aid reform, in short, has been characterized by the
interaction of closely related substantive and procedural goals.
These twin concerns are evident also in what we have termed
the second wave of access-to-justice reform - providing legal
representation for diffuse interests. Examples include public
interest law firms, class and organizational lawsuits, and new
governmental agencies such as the consumer ombudsman
institution. As Hein Kotz, a leading German comparativist, has
stated, this wave is also part of a "general, worldwide
effort." 2 One source of this movement is the recognition that
certain fragmented, diffuse interests tend to be
underrepresented or unrepresented in our legal and
administrative processes. Like the interests of the poor, those
of consumers, environmentalists and certain other groups are
unlikely to retain their own advocates under a market economic
system or a political system responsive to organized interest
groups. 3 Reforms that correct the "imbalance" of advocacy
by providing lawyers and other advocacy agencies can be seen
as correcting a procedural flaw akin to the more strictly legalprocedural problem of providing lawyers to those who cannot
afford them. Again, however, there is a substantive
underpinning to these reforms. They tend to focus on the rights
of the poor, tenants, consumers, and environmentalists, and
the effort is to take those rights and enforce them in the
The staff model clearly cannot provide an entitlement to legal aid for all
those who cannot afford a lawyer. See text, infra at notes 55-60.
,See Legal Services Corporation, The Delivery Systems Study: A Policy
Report to the Congress and the President of the United States
(Washington, D.C.: Legal Services Corporation, 1980). According to the
President of the Corporation, Dan Bradley,
The Corporation, legal services programs, clients and the legal
profession should concentrate . . .on finding and developing creative

local delivery systems, which include combinations of staff attorneys and
lawyers in private practice where such combinations are appropriate and
possible. Such efforts are essential if this nation is ever to provide
comprehensive service for persons unable to afford legal assistance.
Id., iii.
'z Hein Katz, "Public Interest Litigation: A Comparative Survey", in Mauro
Cappelletti, ed., Access to Justice and the Welfare State (Alphen aan den
Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Welfare State], 116.
" See generally, Burton A. Weisbrod, Joel F. Handler, and Neil K. Komesar,
Public Interest Law: An Economic and InstitutionalAnalysis (Berkeley:
Univ. of Calif. Press, 1978).
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interests of cleaner air, sounder products, better housing and
the like.
The "third wave" of reform continues both the substantive
focus on rights and the procedural concern with access. As we
have described it," this approach looks beyond institutions of
representation to the full panoply of institutions that
participate in dispute processing. It is thus characterized by
efforts not only to provide legal representation and process
disputes through traditional judicial forums, but also by a
willingness to experiment with new forms of representation and
new dispute processing institutions. Perhaps the leading
examples of this approach are relatively informal, often
specialized institutions such as consumer complaint boards,
landlord-tenant tribunals and "rentalsmen," small claims
courts, and what in the United States are termed
"neighbourhood justice centers.'"'
It may sometimes be misleading to portray these waves of the
access-to-justice movement as an ideal chronology of reform.
The chronology approximates reasonably well the pattern of
developments in the United States, but movements elsewhere,
especially on the European Continent, began earlier in this
century and left an institutional legacy which anticipated and,6
to an extent, preempted some of the more recent trends.'
German and Austrian courts and procedures, for example, are
much less formal than their American and English
counterparts.'
Nevertheless, the access-to-justice movement can best be
understood if the various components are distinguished, and
the above-defined waves do highlight the principal areas of
reform. The separation of reform types facilitates comparisons
' See, supra note 1.

" Many examples are discussed in v. 1 & 2 of the Florence Access-to-Justice
Project series. See Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant Garth, eds., World
Survey supra note 1; Mauro Cappelletti and John Weisner, eds., Access to
Justice: Promising Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn/Milan:
Sitjhoff/Giuffr6, 1979, v. 2 of Florence Access-to-Justice Project),
(hereinafter cited as PromisingInstitutions]. Recent evidence of activity in
the United States includes the enactment of the Dispute Resolution Act,
Public Law 96-190, on February 12, 1980. The preamble of the Act, which
is designed to encourage alternative dispute processing fora, states that
"for the majority of Americans, mechanisms for the resolution of minor
disputes are largely unavailable, inaccessible, ineffective, expensive, or
unfair." See generally, Maurcie Rosenberg, "Second Class Justice", infra
(1981), 1 Windsor Yearb. Access Justice294.
6See, e.g., E. Blankenburg and V. Reifner, "Conditions of Legal and

Political Culture Limiting the Transferability of Access to Law
Innovations," in Mauro Cappelletti, ed., Welfare State, supra note 12.
'"See,
e.g., Adolf Homburger, "Functions of Orality in Austrian and
American Civil Procedure" (1970), 20 Buffalo L. Rev. 9; Rolf Bender,
"The Stuttgart Model," in M. Cappelletti and J. Weisner, eds., Promising
Institutions,supra note 15, 431.
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across national boundaries, and it reminds us that access to
justice implies a variety of approaches to law and legal
institutions, each with different advantages and disadvantages.
The impact of reform, however, depends on developments
within all three waves of reform. Moreover, reforms can be
inspired by groups with disparate motives. What some see as a
cost-cutting reform, others may see as a means for controlling
conflict, and still others may see in terms of the vindication of
substantive rights.
II. Research Into Access to Justice The Importance of Detail
We can not understand access to justice without focusing on
the details. This requires among other things new research that
can trace the impact of laws and institutions into the lives of
those whose behaviour the law purports to affect. An accurate
assessment of the access-to-justice movement and its particular
manifestations requires an immersion into the details of the
legal profession, court procedures, alternatives to the courts,
and individual decision-making. Details are especially
important because the access-to-justice movement, as we have
suggested, contains several potentially disparate elements.
There is a strong concern on the one hand with "access" for
those who cannot avail themselves of lawyers, courts, and
court-like machinery. Within this context, a focus on access
may encompass a number of goals. The concern might be
simply with enforcing access to lawyers and courts as a legal
and procedural right. Or it might be to reduce barriers that
prevent disputants from utilizing the services of dispute
processing machinery generally. The main impetus for the
creation of the U.S. neighbourhood justice centers, the French
conciliateurs, and similar institutions, for example, seems to be
a belief that disputants need to be provided with new, accessible
institutions to resolve certain kinds of disputes. In either
situation, the focus is on making the institution available as a
practical matter to those who might want to use it.
On the other hand, we may choose to focus more on the
justice that results from improved access. This justice might be
defined simply as synonymous with a resolution of the dispute
acceptable to both sides. The justice sought by access-to-justice
reformers, however, tends to be rooted in the substantive
concerns described before. Reforms are sought that will
provide access to individuals and groups such that the rights of
the poor, tenants, consumers, and the like will be vindicated.
Furthermore, the idea is that these rights will not only be
vindicated in the courts or court-like machinery, but they
should also result in beneficial changes in the day-to-day lives
of the groups for whom the rights were created.
Finally, we must recognize that another impetus for reform is
simply the desire to reduce court congestion and the costs to the
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government of processing disputes. This concern has inspired
some creativity, but obviously this is primarily a negative goal.
Indeed, even those who wish primarily to cut costs tend to
argue in terms of the procedural or substantive goals more
central to the ideology of the access-to-justice movement.
In order to ascertain how a given set of procedures affects the
new substantive rights characteristic of modern welfare states,
we must encourage considerable empirical research. Very subtle
institutional changes can make an enormous practical
difference. In small claims courts, for example, such factors as
the substantive law knowledge of judges, their approach to the
parties and to the dispute, the availability and quality of
assistance to litigants, and the general profile of the court in the
community may determine what the court's performance will
be with respect to the implementation of, say, consumer or
tenant rights.' 8 As Marc Galanter has recently noted,
substantive law and dispute processing agencies send out
signals affecting what he terms the "indigenous law" that
regulates affairs among individuals and groups. I"
The results obtained in court produce one set of signals, but
other characteristics of dispute processing institutions including speed, cost, formality - also determine how
community activity is affected by the existence of that
institution. Finally, it is necessary to study the community itself
and its existing (or indigenous) methods of handling disputes.2 0
As a recent discussion of this problem concluded, "designing
institutions of justice from the 'top' down without knowledge
of what conditions hold in the neighbourhoods will risk
creating ineffective and costly institutions with little prospect of
dealing with the bulk of their potential clientele." 2 '
These detailed studies sometimes force us to revise our
preconceptions about how rights are enforced. One might
expect, for example, that a consumer will have a better chance
of enforcing new, often complicated, legal rights by retaining a
lawyer than by proceeding as an individual to an informal or
conciliatory institution. Steward Macaulay, however, has
'8

'9

See, e.g., J. Ruhnka, S. Weller, and J. Martin, Small Claims Courts: A
National Examination (Williamsburg: National Center for State Courts,
1978), J. Ruhnka, Housing Justice in Small Claims Courts (Williamsburg:
National Center for State Courts, 1979).
Marc Galanter, "Justice in Many Rooms", in M. Cappelletti, ed., Welfare
State, supra note 12.
Sally Engle Merry, "Going to Court: Strategies of Dispute
Management in an American Urban Neighborhood" (1979), 13 Law and

20 See, e.g.,

Society Rev. 891.
Buckle and S. Thomas-Buckle, "Bringing

21L.

Justice Home: Some

Thoughts and the Neighborhood Justice Policy" (unpublished paper for

the 1980 Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, Madison,
Wisconsin, June 5, 1980), 34.
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shown the fallacy of such a simple dichotomy in his recent
study of lawyers and consumer protection law in Wisconsin.
Sometimes lawyers use their status as experts in the law, legal
arguments, and express or implied threats of legal action ...
Often, however, a legal style of argument fades into the
background. The attorney may not be too sure about the precise
legal situation or may worry about seeming to coerce the other
party. In such situations lawyers are likely to appeal to some
mixture of the interest of the opponent and to standards of
reasonableness apart from claims of legal right.22
Such lawyers, playing "nonadversary roles without great
knowledge of the contours of consumer law," 23 are very similar
to the mediators or conciliators one might find in an informal
institution created as an alternative to lawyers and courts.
Studies of this nature provide an invaluable means to assess
the actual impact of new rights and procedures - the practical
meaning of access to justice. The Windsor Yearbook will
contribute immensely to this field by providing a forum for
these studies, which tend to be anthropological or sociological
in approach. When we understand the details, however, we
must place them into a more general framework. Many key
issues, for example, can profitably be examined from an
economic perspective." A psychological approach has also
proved useful. 25 A real understanding of access to justice,
however, cannot avoid some political perspective. Access to
justice necessarily implicates issues central to the politics of the
modern welfare state.
III. Research Into Access to Justice - Political Aspects
Substantive goals inherent in the access-to-justice movement
place it squarely within the tradition of welfare state politics.
As mentioned before, the rights at the center of accessimproving reforms are those typical of welfare state efforts to
bolster the position of the weak - especially individuals in such
Stewart Macaulay, "Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws" (1979), 14

22

23 Law and Society Rev. 115, 152.

1d., 153.

24

See Burton A. Weisbrod et al., supra note 13; Robert A. Bush, "The
Economic Significance of Access to Justice: An Analysis of Resource
Allocation to Dispute-Resolution Services, in Relation to Public PolicyMaking and the Public Interest", in M. Cappelletti and B. Garth, eds.,

Access to Justice: Emerging Issues and Perspectives (Alphen aan den
25

Rijn/Milan: Sijthoff/Giuffr , 1979, v. 3 of the Florence Acces-to-Justice
Project), 191.
See, e.g., Gtlnter Bierbrauer, Josef Falke, and Klaus-Friedrich Koch,
"Conflict and its Settlement: An Interdisciplinary Study Concerning the
Legal Basis, Function and Performance of the Institution of the
Schiedsmann", in M. Cappelletti and J. Weisner, eds., Promising
Institutions,supra note 15, 39.
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capacities as consumers, tenants, or employees - against
relatively powerful organizations. The welfare state has been
characterized increasingly by the proliferation of such rights rights that are designed to promote social change on behalf of
the "have-nots".
The existence of substantive rights
representing broad social goals has helped to inspire the
access-to-justice movement. It has promoted close critical
scrutiny of the courts and the legal profession on the grounds

that no social institutions - even the professions - can avoid
being measured by the standards of important political and
social goals. 26 Thus, while the results of the English Royal

Commission on Legal Services27 may have been disappointing

in some areas,2 8 the Commission's existence and work illustrate
the increasing tendency to ask how the profession and the
courts serve what is defined as the public interest.29
While the political impact of the welfare state on lawyers and
courts is important,10 we must try to go beyond those issues to
the politics of the welfare state itself. We must focus, for
example, on the sources and tensions involved in the
proliferation and implementation of welfare state rights.3" One
assumption access reformers may make is that the legislative
creation of a right implies a societal commitment to its full
enforcement. The political reality is much more complicated.3 2
See, e.g., Luhmann, "The Legal Profession: Comments on the Situation in
the Federal Republic" in D. MacCormick, ed., Lawyers in their Social
Setting (Edinburgh: W. Green & Son, Ltd., 1976), 98, 113. ("[Tlhe
mutations of law can no longer be controlled by means of the hitherto
existing dogmatic methods").
27 U.K. Royal Commission on Legal Services, Final Report, Cmnd. 7648
(London: H.M.S.O., 1979).
26 An example would be the recommendations for the community law centres.
See, e.g., Bryant Garth, "The Benson Report: A Reactionary View of
Community Law Centres" (1980), 5 Legal Services Bulletin 147.
29 See, e.g., Michael Zander, Legal Services for the Community (London:
Temple Smith, 1978). In the United States there has been a dramatic
increase in legislative interest in the courts and the legal profession. See,
e.g., Access to Justice Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, 96th Congress, I st Session, February 13 and 27, 1979
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov't. Printing Office, 1979).
30 See generally, Richard Abel, "Legal Services", in M. Olsen and M.
Micklin, eds., Frontiers of Applied Sociology (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, forthcoming); D. Rueschemeyer, "The Legal Profession in
Comparative Perspective", in H. Johnson, ed., Social System and Legal
Process(San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 1978), 97.
31 See, e.g., Stuart A. Scheingold, The Politics of Rights: Lawyers, Public,
Policy, and Political Change (New Haven: Yale U. Press, 1974); M.
Edelman, PoliticalLanguage: Words that Succeed and Policies that Fail
(New York: Academic Press, 1977); P. Nonet, "What Price Rights?", in
E.
Blankenburg, ed., Innovations in the Legal Services
(Konigstein/Cambridge, Mass.: Anton Hain/Oelgeschlager, Gunn and
Hain, 1980), 183.
32 See, e.g., Stuart A. Scheingold, id.; M. Edelman, id.
26

xviii
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At one extreme new rights may, represent political symbols
enacted by those who wish to mollify dissent without effecting
any serious change." At the other extreme would be rights that
policymakers wish to have enforced at virtually any cost. The
typical situation is that legislators proliferate rights with an
understanding that they will be enforced at a certain level and
impose a more or less predictable burden on those against
whom they are enforced.
Access reforms may drastically affect that level of
enforcement, and that in turn may lead to a strong political
reaction manifested in hostility to the underlying substantive
law or to the procedural reform. The practical result of reaction
may be a retreat from the promise implied in the creation or
expansion of a right. That is not the necessary result, however.
It might be that the partially "symbolic" right cannot be easily
withdrawn. The creation of the right may set in motion forces
that enlarge its political constituency.3 ' We must explore these
connections between rights and the mobilization of political
power. The role of the legal profession here merits particular
attention. If lawyers are inclined to take the position that, in an
optimally functioning legal system, rights should not go
unenforced because of procedural barriers to access - and the
profession has tended toward that position - then that will add
to the political momentum in favour of the rights.3" A
consideration of these kinds of issues - the relationship of new
rights and access reforms to the distribution of national and
local political power - will lead us, moreover, to a better
understanding of the role of law in the welfare state.
A few brief examples can illustrate the need to consider these
issues of political power. First, there is a growing body of
literature showing that, despite the achievements resulting from
legal aid reforms, public interest law, and other institutions
that act as advocates for underrepresented interests, there are
serious limits as to what they can accomplish on their own. 36
Strong arguments, even if coupled with victories in courts and
administrative agencies, do not necessarily produce lasting
3 According to Joel F. Handler, "Symbols [such as test case victories, new
laws, and new agencies] are used by the entrenched interests to assuage
dissident groups, to give them the feeling that they have accomplished their
objectives when in fact tangible results are withheld." Joel F. Handler,
"Public Interest Law: Problems and Prospects", in The American
Assembly, Law and the American Future, M. Schwartz, ed., (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1976), 99, 110.
5' See Stuart A. Scheingold, supra note 31.
3 A typical example is the following article by a former American Bar
Association President: S. Shepherd Tate, "Access to Justice" (1976), 65
American Bar Association Journal 904. See also, e.g., Society of Labour
Lawyers, Legal ServicesforAll (London: Fabian Society, 1978).
36 See, e.g., Joel F. Handler, supra note 3; David M. Trubek, "Review of
Balancing the Scales of Justice: Financing Public Interest Law in
America", 119771 Wisconsin L. Rev. 303.
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change for underprivileged groups. Lawyers and courts lack the
resources and ability to see that victories are brought to the
attention of potential beneficiaries and to monitor enforcement
on a large scale. Implementation tends to require the active
participation of private organizations able to educate their
members, monitor the enforcement of rights, and, where
necessary, lobby in political forums on the strength of more
than just the persuasiveness of their arguments. Recognizing
this situation, leaders in the legal services and public interest
movement are now urging that legal representation be seen as a
means to preserve and strengthen private initiatives, not as a
substitute. "
A second example of the significance of issues concerning
political power can be taken from the "third wave" of reform
- in particular the trend toward the creation of informal
dispute processing institutions. To the extent that such
institutions are concerned with disputes involving parties with
unequal power, their effectiveness may be seriously limited.
Outcomes may resemble what would have resulted from
negotiations, and that may favour the more powerful party at
the expense of enforcement of rights. Consumer and tenant
rights, for example, have not fared well in most U.S. small
claims courts." Laura Nader has pointed this out recently:
The fundamental problem that constrains the performance of
alternative complaint mechanisms today derives from their
inability to compensate adequately for the ineffective bargaining
position of the individual who confronts large corporations and
government bureaucracies. 3
Thus, the efforts of these third wave reforms depend largely on
the success of reforms in waves one and two. Legal aid and
public interest law can strengthen bargaining positions because
of the possibility of court action (and, with class actions, the
possibility of aggregating claims). A plausible threat to litigate
is one source of power. Beyond litigation, however, we are
returned to the need for organizations that can add greater
political strength. 0 To quote Nader again, for disputeprocessing reform "to have any likelihood of yielding more
citizen
than symbolic victories, an active and vital grass-roots
4
and consumer movement must be encouraged. " '

See the sources, supra note 3.
See the sources, supra note 1.
9 Laura Nader, "Disputing Without the Force of Law" (1979), 88 Yale Law
Journal 998.
40 Among other things, organizations can help enact and protect favourable
laws, make members aware of their rights, provide resources to take legal
or other action, and monitor the quality and results of the dispute
processing institution. The leading analysis of this is Marc Galanter, supra
note 3.
41 See Laura Nader, supra note 39, 1021.
"
"
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Access to justice thus requires close attention to the politics
of the welfare state. The movement to enforce rights on behalf
of the underprivileged is an effort to realize the promises of the
welfare state. Hostility to access reforms may evince a more
profound hostility to social reform. Indeed, even some of the
supporters of access reforms may be interested in curbing the
so-called "explosion of welfare rights" by channeling disputes
into non-adversary, conciliatory proceedings where demands
are moderated and there is less of an emphasis on rights. As
Harry Street observed about access to justice, "[t]here is one
big enveloping issue: justice in the Welfare State."" 2
That overriding issue requires us to examine another political
dimension of the access-to-justice movement. Access to justice,
as noted before, is closely connected to the welfare state
proliferation of rights associated with groups having inherently
weak statuses - consumers, tenants, debtors, unemployed.' 3
We must be willing to discuss the issue of whether the best way
to benefit such groups is to create new legal rights and try to
find means of enforcing them. There are, after all, some subtle
costs - economic and otherwise - of this legalistic solution to
social problems. First, it is obvious that the law must be
involved in individuals' daily lives to an unprecedented degree.
Recent attacks on law in the welfare state, in fact, tended to
focus on "overregulation" and excessive legalism."'
Less attention has been paid to the problems of dependency
and accountability that inhere in any large scale effort at rights
enforcement. The problem of dependency stems from the effort
to make ordinary people aware of their rights and persuade
them to invoke the law. That means convincing people that
many everyday problems that individuals would otherwise
handle in their own way are legal problems requiring for their
solution the intervention of a lawyer, judge, or other legal
actor. From one perspective we can say that "legal needs" are
being met, but from another we might complain that
individuals are being deprived of their autonomy and being
coerced, directly or indirectly, to follow the decisions of legal
professionals - indeed, that "legal needs" are artificially
created.' 5
42
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Similarly, to the extent that professionals define and
promote the satisfaction of "legal needs" according to their
own priorities, there is a problem of accountability. Given the
vast array of potential problems, we must face the issue of
who should decide which ones should be made into priorities
for active intervention. One of the central dilemmas of the
access-to-justice movement is how rights can be enforced
without promoting a dependency to a professional group
unaccountable in this area to the public it is supposed to serve.
Experiments in lay participation and control offer some
potential, but we must admit that results thus far have been
mixed 46
The troubling political question remains that of "what price
rights?" 4" The effort to realize the substantive goals of welfare
state legislation raises a number of complicated issues involving
important tradeoffs among competing goals. Nevertheless,
these complications should not lead us to retreat from the
modern promise of access to justice. As Andr6 Tunc observed,
"[ejconomic regulation is a poor substitute for social ethics;
social security, a poor substitute for spontaneous community
solidarity. But both are unavoidable for the protection of man
in our present societies."" 8 Welfare state methods are surely
imperfect, but they do offer some way to improve the position
of the disadvantaged. If we believe that those methods are
"unavoidable" in our present societies, we must take seriously

the substantive political goals implicit in the access to justice
movement.
Here we are thrust again into questions of detail that require
the close attention of those with an interest in access to justice.
it may be that reforms can strengthen local initiative and
individual autonomy at the same time they facilitate rights
enforcement. Only serious study can provide a credible answer
to that important question; it is clear that one goal of many
within the access-to-justice movement has been to find ways of
avoiding activities that produce debilitating dependencies on
legal professionals. 49 Success in that venture, of course, will not

resolve all the problems of the welfare state, nor will it
transform the powerless into the powerful, but it can provide
e.g., the study by Diane Deschamps in Commission des services
juridiques, 1977 Annual Report (Montreal: Commission des services
juridiques, 1977) 103. See generally, Bryant Garth, supra note 8, 203-217.
47 See P. Nonet, supra note 31.
48 Andr6 Tune, "The Quest for Justice", in M. Cappelletti, ed., Welfare
Law, supra note 12.
49 An excellent Canadian example is Roland Penner, "The Development of
Community Legal Services in Canada: An Evaluation of Parkdale
Community Legal Services in Toronto, Dalhousie Legal Aid Service in
Halifax, and Community Legal Service, Inc., in Point St. Charles,
Montreal" (unpublished, 1977).
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considerable help to the disadvantaged; we clearly have not yet
exhausted this potential avenue of social change.
IV. Legal Aspects of Access to Justice
The discussion of the political aspects of access to justice has
led us to focus almost exclusively on the substantive goals of
access reformers and how those goals relate to the welfare state.
Earlier, however, we emphasized that the movement has
received considerable impetus also from a concern with issues
that are more procedural than substantive - especially the
right of effective access to courts and administrative agencies
for individuals and groups who have traditionally been unable
to obtain the advantage of those forums. 50 This right, in fact, is
given special status in modern constitutions such as those of the
Federal Republic of Germany 5 ' and Italy;"2 and the right of
access is enforceable among the signatories of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights."
There are potential contradictions between this procedural
aspect of the access-to-justice movement and the substantive
goals discussed before. In the first place, a right to access to
courts may inhibit experimentation and reform, especially that
which results in the creation of alternative institutions to
process disputes. In Italy, for example, a law requiring that
access be to an alternative institution instead of a court would
clearly be unconstitutional."
This emphasis on lawyers and courts makes it all the more
difficult to make justice available to large numbers of persons,
and it also creates obstacles to the legal realization of
substantive rights on a very large scale. The inescapable fact is
that no society is likely to provide a lawyer and a formal
judicial proceeding to anyone with a tenable legal claim, and it
is even less likely that a society will encourage lawyers to reach
out affirmatively to mobilize rights-enforcing litigation among
all such individuals. Even if that were a desirable goal, it would
be inconceivable to commit enough resources to provide "Rolls
Royce Justice" to everyone and every legal claim. Thus, to the
extent that a right of access channels limited resources toward
lawyers and formal courts, it may preclude the kind of reforms
that can mobilize more people to assert rights and obtain their
enforcement.
50
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The potential trade-off may be seen in the contrast between
judicare and staff legal aid systems. Judicare systems - or at
- are
least combined systems with a judicare component 55
This
counsel.
to
right
civil
a
of
granting
the
associated with
system can do that partly because it makes the resources of the
private bar available to help those who cannot afford legal
services. In contrast, a staff system inevitably lacks a sufficient
number of lawyers to respond fully to the demand for legal
services. There are other reasons, however, for this contrast.
First, the judicare lawyers tend to be reactive, waiting passively
for clients to seek their services. The lawyers, as in England,
may not be permitted as a rule to handle small claims, 5 6 and
they clearly do not reach out affirmatively to all who could use
their services. As a practical matter, they could not do that and
still handle all cases as a matter of right.5 7 The result is that
judicare systems tend58to be dominated by matrimonial matters
and criminal defense.

In contrast, staff systems have sought to reach beyond
matrimonial matters and criminal defense (where criminal
defense is not assigned to another agency) to tenant, welfare,
consumer, and other problems that are not generally brought to
a law office.59 That requires a policy of going out into the
cpmmunity. The problem is that this affirmative behaviour
makes it still more difficult to guarantee the provision of legal
aid as a matter of right. Staff offices are drowned in work, and
they must set priorities. Those priorities for the most part
reflect an emphasis not on handling every claim possible, but
the new substantive rights typical of the
rather on enforcing
60
welfare state.

It can be argued, therefore, that the kind of affirmative legal
aid required to vindicate welfare state rights is inconsistent with
a right of access to counsel. Staff and judicare systems can of
course be combined, making it possible to guarantee legal aid
as a matter of right to a greater number of people, but there
remains the inconsistency between that right and the need to
5 See, e.g., M. Cappelletti, "Legal Aid in Western Europe: A Turmoil"
(1974), 60 American Bar Association Journal206.
56 See, e.g., L. Bridges, B. Sufrin, J. Whetton, and R. White, Legal Services
in Birmingham (Birmingham: Institute for Judicial Administration, 1975),
159 (criticizing the English plan for that reason).
57 "If all the lawyers in the country worked full time, they could not deal with
even the articulated legal problems of the poor. An even if somehow
lawyers could deal with those articulated problems, they would not change
very much the tangle of unarticulated legal troubles in which poor people
live." Stephen Wexler, "Practicing Law for Poor People" (1970), 79 Yale
Law Journal 1049, 1053. See generally, Leon H. Mayhew, "Institutions of
Legal Representation: Civil Justice and the Public" (1975), 9 Law and

Society Rev. 401.

58See B. Garth, supra note 8, 145-70.
59
See id.
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pick and choose among clients and claims if the aim is to reach
the new rights and help promote their vindication.
The tension between access as a procedural right and the
substantive goals of welfare state access reformers, however,
can be resolved partly through a more flexible definition of a
right of access. An important recent decision of the European
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg illustrates a trend toward
a more expansive view of what is meant by a right of access to
justice. In the Airey case decided October 9, 1979, the Court
held that Ireland deprived Mrs. Airey of her right of effective
access because it provided neither a lawyer at the state's
expense nor a simplified proceeding which would have enabled
her to obtain a matrimonial separation without the need of a
lawyer. 6 ' This kind of flexibility suggests that the procedural

dimension of a right to access can be modified to favour less
expensive, less formal procedures rather than access only to
lawyers and formal courts.6 2 The legal and procedural sources
of the access-to-justice movement may be able to merge with
the political and substantive goals which have also motivated
reform.
The potential for merger raises another issue that must be
confronted: how far do we want to go toward encouraging such
a merger? The answer is not simple. On the one hand, the
purpose of a constitutional or otherwise "entrenched" right of
access is to place it above political struggles - to allow
individuals or groups to demand and obtain a full hearing in an
independent court on their grievances and a reasoned decision
based on the law. It does not matter whether their claims are
politically popular or extremely controversial. On the other
hand, if we modify that right of access such that some persons
and claims are coerced, directly or indirectly, into an informal
alternative proceeding, we may be subjecting that right to
prevailing political priorities. Access limited to such a
proceeding may mean that unpopular legal rights are deprived
of an institution for their effective vindication.
If access reformers trust prevailing political priorities, they
may be willing to run that risk in order to facilitate the
widespread enforcement of welfare state rights, but they must
be wary of what might happen if the political climate changes.
The problem is not merely academic. Hostility to the welfare
state has grown tremendously as a political force of the last few
years, both in Western Europe and North America. If that
represents a reassertion of the power of the large organizational
interests against the ideal of a welfare state, then we must be
61 European Court of Human Rights, Airey Case, Judgment of 9 October
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especially careful. An entrenched right of access may limit the
widespread enforcement of the rights of disadvantaged groups,
but it does ensure that political expediency will not prevent
those rights from obtaining a full legal hearing by diverting all
potential claimants to what could be a less than satisfactory
alternative. We have said before that the political priorities
embodied in the access-to-justice movement must not cause us
to "sell our soul" in legal procedures. 3 We must be aware that
the weakening of formal procedural rights will not always
promote the kind of substantive goals we seek.
Conclusion
Ambiguities and pitfalls pervade the access-to-justice
movement. It is the task of interdisciplinary and comparative
scholarship and empirical research to clarify these problems,
monitor developments relevant to access to justice, and
facilitate creative efforts to respond to the social problems that
to a great extent inspired the access-to-justice movement in the
first place. The Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice can be a
leading forum for that kind of scholarly interchange. As we
have suggested in the preceding pages, the great mass of work
remains to be done.

63 See Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant Garth, eds., World Survey, supra note

1,123.

